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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS
APPEAL, STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW,
AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
1.

Did the trial court err in ruling, as a matter of law,

that attorney's fees are not recoverable as consequential
damages in a wrongful termination action?
Standard of Review: correctness of the court's ruling.

See

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).
2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

dismissing

Heslop's

contractual public policy claim at the close of Heslop's case in
chief?
Standard of Review;-No
claim.

substantial evidence

to support the

Brehany v. Nordstroms, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Casef Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
in the Trial Court
The trial court ruled, as a matter of law that Heslopfs

attorney1s fees were not consequential damages.
During the hearing on the Bank of Utahfs

(Tr. 1565)
(hereinafter

"Bank") Motion for JNOV or, in the Alternative, for New Trial,
the trial court rejected Heslop's argument that the Bank failed
to object to the court's refusal to instruct the jury to
disregard the accrual and related evidence once the public
policy claim was dismissed.
Court.

The issue is properly before the

(Supplemental Transcript on Appeal, hereinafter Supp.

Tr., 28-29, attached hereto as Addendum 1)

00767
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in his order denying the Bankfs Motion for JNOV/New Trial,
Judge Roth specifically removed language from the order that the
verdict of constructive discharge was supported by "substantial"
evidence. The order simply states there was evidence to support
this finding.

(R. 1184)

B. Additional Statement of Facts
After the Bank was reorganized in January, 1983, company
cars were taken away from all officers, not just Heslop.
(Tr. 1060-61)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The jury's verdict must be supported by substantial

evidence.

Only admissible and competent evidence counts as

substantial.

The verdict of constructive discharge was not

supported by substantial evidence because it was based on
Heslop1s

self-interested,

implausible

testimony

and

on

inadmissible and prejudicial evidence. The verdict of impliedin-fact contract was not supported by substantial evidence
because it was based on oral representations and/or course of
conduct which was not admissible in the face of an unambiguous
employee handbook containing no provisions for termination only
for cause. Heslop1s employment application unambiguously stated
he was an employee at will.

Absent fraud or imposition he is

estopped to deny it. The jury verdict finding no good cause to
terminate was not supported by substantial evidence where Heslop
lied to the bank about the Gabbert loan.

00787
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2.
bank,

In the alternative to ordering judgment in favor of the
the

court

should

order

a

new

trial

due

to

the

insufficiency of the evidence and the admission of prejudicial
evidence.
3.

Heslop's own testimony that he had an employment

contract until age 65 terminable only for cause is barred by
U.C.A. § 25-5-4(1) because "by its terms [it] is not to be
performed within one year".
4.

Attorney1s fees should not be awarded as consequential

damages in an implied-in-fact contract case. Where the contract
is implied only, the parties would not have reasonably foreseen
attorney1s fees as a consequential damage item.

No Utah

employment cases have held attorney's fees are recoverable in
this context.
5.

The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on

Heslop's claimed breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing because Utah does not recognize such a claim in the
context

of

this

wrongful

termination

case.

Brehany

v.

Nordstroms, Inc., infra.
6. Heslop's tort public policy claim was properly dismissed
on summary judgment because Utah does not recognize such a
claim.

Furthermore, the court properly granted the Bank's

motion to dismiss the contract public policy claim at the end of
Heslop's evidence because there was no causal connection between
the alleged public policy violations and Heslop's resignation
from the bank.
00787
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resignation in January 1983 cut off any causal connection
between his termination and the alleged violation of the call
report statute prior to January of 1983.

Heslopfs failure to

report illegal conduct to regulatory authorities bars his public
policy claim.

There is no evidence Heslop was terminated

because he refused to perform a requested illegal act, which
bars the public policy claim.

The evidence of a public policy

violation is the same, whether it is considered a tort or a
contract claim. Therefore, summary judgment on the tort public
policy claim can be affirmed based on the absence of any
substantial evidence to support the contract public policy
claim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THE JURYfS VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL, RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
A.

The Bank Is Not Required to Marshal Inadmissible Evidence
Heslop argues the Bank failed to properly marshal the

evidence. Heslop1s criticism is unfounded. A jury verdict can
only be sustained upon "believable and admissible evidence,"
Durfey v. Board of Ed. of Wayne Cty., Etc., 604 P.2d 480 (Utah
1979) (emphasis added); In Re Estate of Hubbard, 30 Utah 2d 260,
516 P.2d

741

(1973).

Therefore, any failure to marshal

inadmissible evidence cannot be a basis for affirming the jury
verdict.
Heslop
00787

Nonetheless, the Bank did marshal evidence which
claims

supports

the

juryfs

verdict
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(including

inadmissible evidence) in great detail, including, inter alia:
Bank's policy to terminate only for cause (Bank's Initial Brief,
hereinafter Br., 7, 9); Heslop's employment history (Br. 9-10);
accrual account problems, including wash entries and Heslop's
favoring a one-time resolution to the problem (Br. 10-16, 24);
Attorney General' s investigation (Br. 16-18); hiring of Timmons,
his salary, and payments to Peat, Marwick (Br. 18-21, 36-37);
Heslop's claim he was demoted (Br. 23); Heslop's testimony West
told him to commit the Gabbert loan before an appraisal (Br.
27);

Heslop's

testimony

Kleyn

demanded

Heslop's

written

resignation (Br. 33)T Beutler's resignation and termination of
Carlsen (Br. 38).
B.

The Jury's Verdict Must Be Supported By Substantial
Relevant Evidence

This Court will reverse a jury verdict where it is not
supported by substantial evidence.

Canyon Country Store v.

Bracey, 781 P. 2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989)

The verdict must be

supported by substantial competent evidence.1"

:Ed. at 418.

Accord, Cambelt Intern. Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah
1987) . ("We will not overturn that verdict when it is supported
by substantial and competent evidence.")
In Utah State Road Comm'n v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888
(Utah 1975), the Supreme Court held there was no substantial
evidence to support a $75,000 severance damage verdict and
defined substantial as follows:
. . . the modifying adjective "substantial" has
been used advisedly to indicate a higher degree
00787
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of proof than just any evidence of any kind.
The requirement is that the evidence must be
sufficient in amount and credibility that, when
considered in connection with the other
evidence and circumstances shown in the case,
would justify some, but not necessarily all,
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon, to
believe it to be the truth. And conversely, if
when so considered, the court is convinced that
it is so inconsequential, or so clearly lacking
in credibility, that no jury acting fairly and
reasonably could so believe, it cannot properly
be regarded as substantial evidence.
533 P.2d at 890 (emphasis added).

The Court concluded the

evidence was insufficient because the owner1s testimony "may
well have been suffused with a high degree of self-interest."
533 P.2d at 891.
"When testimony of witnesses is in conflict, we accept that
testimony which supports the jury's verdict, unless it is
inherently implausible . . . ."

Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.,

811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added).
In determining whether there is substantial evidence to
support the verdict in the instant case, the Court is entitled
to

consider

sufficiency

of

the

evidence

in

amount

and

credibility, self-interest of plaintiff's own testimony, and
implausibility of testimony.
1. The Jury's Verdict That Hesiop was Constructively
Discharged Does Not Meet the Substantial Evidence
Standard.
(a) Self-Interested,
Testimony.

Implausible, and Uncorroborated

Heslop's claim of constructive discharge was built upon his
own, self-interested testimony, which was in conflict with the
00787
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testimony of other witnesses. Specifically, Heslopfs testimony
regarding the $50,000 condition for closing the Gabbert loan was
directly contradicted by West who testified the loan should not
have been closed and the money disbursed unless the $50,000
condition was met (Tr. 557-58) which it was not.

(Tr. 558,

1079-80, 1278-79, 1389)
Next, Heslopfs testimony that Kleyn, upon orders from
Timmons, demanded his written resignation, was contradicted by
all other witnesses (West, Kleyn, and Timmons) who testified
regarding that issue.

(Tr. 569-70, 775-76, 788-89, 1286)

Kleyn, West, and Timmons had not been employed by the Bank
for several years when the case was tried.
777-78, 1221-22)
testifying

as

(Tr. 502, 756-57,

None of them had self-interest to protect by

they

did

regarding

the

resignation

issue.

Heslop's testimony was clearly self-interested, as is shown by
the great significance he places on his assertion that Timmons
demanded his resignation.
59)

(See Heslop's Brief at 38, 42, 46,

Heslop's testimony is incredible and implausible on the

resignation issue.
Further, there was no evidence except Heslop's that he had
no reasonable

alternative

authority was revoked.

to resigning

after his

Kleyn and West both testified Heslop

could have continued to work as a lending officer.
791)

lending

(Tr. 569,

Whether an employerfs act constitutes a constructive

discharge

is not determined by

the employee's

subjective

reaction to it. Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).
007S7
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Significantly, even the trial judge, after having heard all
the evidence, was not convinced there was "substantial" evidence
to support the jury's verdict on the constructive discharge
claim. (R. 1184)

Thus, it was error to deny the Bank's motion

for JNOV.
(b) Browning's Refusal To Accept Heslop1s Resignation
In January 1983.
Browning's refusal, in January 1983, to accept Heslop1s
offer to resign undercuts the argument that evidence of the
accrual account and pre-1983 related events is relevant.
Heslop downplays Browning's refusal, citing Browning's testimony
that he wanted

to

avoid

turnover of key personnel.

This

testimony, however, does not support Heslop's claim that he was
put in a dead-end position to force him to resign.

Conversely,

it is perfectly consistent with the Bank's position that Heslop
was made agricultural loan specialist because he could best
serve the Bank in that position and not as punishment for prior
acts.
(c) Heslop Was Not
Mistreatment

Singled

Out

For

A

Pattern

of

Cases cited by Heslop supporting his claim of constructive
discharge are distinguishable.

In Real v. Continental Group,

Inc. , 627 F.Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1986), the evidence showed Real
was passed over for a promotion because of his age; was demoted
to a new position which was subsequently eliminated; was offered
a

new

position

typically
00787

but

granted

to

denied

relocation

others; was

benefits

denied

a

which

request

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were
for

a

different position; and was ultimately offered a new job which
involved a nine grade demotion.

The court found Real "was

subjected to a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment.11
The court distinguished Realfs claim from Frazer v. KFC
National Management Co., 491 F.Supp. 1099 (N.D. Ga. 1980), in
which there was no constructive discharge where plaintiff quit
rather than be demoted even though his salary and benefits
stayed the same. Frazer is more analogous to Heslop1s case than
Real. Real involved several instances of discriminatory conduct
directed specifically at plaintiff. The same cannot be said of
Heslop.
Heslop also argues, relying on Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 894
F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990) that he was constructively discharged
because the Bank's actions were unduly harsh to him as opposed
to co-workers. He asserts he was placed in a dead-end position
and told he could make no agricultural loans.
42)

(Heslop Brief at

Heslop conveniently fails to cite his own testimony that

even after reorganization, he could still make commercial loans
(Tr. 376) and did make new agricultural loans to existing
customers.

(Tr. 374)

The agricultural lending policy was Bank-wide, clearly not
directed solely at Heslop.

The Bank had problems in 1981-82,

and sweeping changes were made to address them, all of which
were approved by the entire Board.
implausible

00787

to

suggest

the

Bank

(Exh. 77D, 78D)
would

approve
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It is
both

a

reorganization and a new loan policy with the object of singling
out Heslop.

No employee is that important.

Even revocation of lending authority was not exclusively
aimed at Heslop.

(Tr. 568-69, 637-38, 1057, 1091, 1249, 1283-

84; Exh. 16-P) Total revocation of Heslop1s independent lending
authority was a single incident, and not sufficient to establish
a constructive discharge.
(d) Heslop Was Not Given An Ultimatum Or Condition For
Continued Employment.
Zilmer v. Carnation Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. App.
1989),

does

discharge.

not

support

Zilmer

was

Heslop1s
told

that

claim

of

constructive

obtaining

a certified

management accountant certificate was a pre-condition to his
continued

employment, without

exception.

After

Zilmer1s

termination, this requirement was not enforced by the company.
No such condition was put on Heslopfs continued employment.
In Spulak, supra, plaintiff "was given an ultimatum either
to retire or be fired."

Id. at 1154. This did not happen with

Heslop, but again shows the significance of his claim he was
told to resign by Kleyn.
Price v. Boulder Valley School D.R.-2, 782 P.2d 821 (Colo.
App. 1989) is dissimilar from the instant case.

Price was a

school teacher diagnosed as manic-depressive who suffered an
emotional breakdown.

His principal prepared a letter of

resignation for Price and presented it to him for signature on
several occasions.

00787
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letter. This is clearly different from the factual situation in
Heslop*s case.
(e) There Was No Pattern Of Termination Of Long-Term
Employees.
There

are

significant

inconsistencies

Heslop1s

in

interpretation of the alleged relevant evidence. Heslop argues
terminations of other employees were relevant to show a pattern
of placing long-term employees in dead-end positions so they
would quit. This so-called pattern involved only two employees
(West and Peacock), both of whose positions were changed and who
left the Bank after Heslop resigned.

(Heslop's Brief at 29-30)

Carlsenfs termination the same month as Heslop resigned does not
fit the pattern because he was expressly fired.
reductions of force

in 1983, do not

The two major

follow the pattern.

Furthermore, West and Kleyn, both long-term employees (Exh. 57D,
64D) were

not

put

in

dead-end

positions

when

reorganized. West was made senior lending officer.

the Bank
(Exh. 78D)

The evidence of other employees' terminations does not meet
the admissibility standard of Rule 406, U. R. E. on evidence of
routine practice.

Heslop relies on Spulak, supra, to support

the admissibility of this evidence. However, Spulak was an age
discrimination claim where such evidence was "relevant to the
issue of the employer's discriminatory intent."
1156 (emphasis added).

894 F.2d at

Heslop asserts no such issue in the

instant case.
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Heslop1 s pattern theory is irreconcilable with his testimony
that Timmons told Kleyn to demand Heslop's resignation.

If

Timmons could not fire Heslop and instead put him in a dead-end
position so he would quit, how could he demand resignation?
Heslop cannot have it both ways.
Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App.
1990), is distinguishable.

It involved testimony of prior

accidents at the same location plaintiff fell as well as prior
notice of a defect.

In the instant case, the other terminations

occurred after Heslop left the Bank.

Finally, the evidence was

not relevant to show the former employees' bias. Heslop did not
intend to discredit his own witnesses by showing their bias, and
the Bank objected to the testimony in the first place.
(f)

Cases Cited By The Bank Are Persuasive.

Although Heslop did not have an express written agreement
for a specific period of time, his assertion throughout the case
that he had an employment contract terminable only for cause,
and

that

the

Bank

had

no

cause

to

terminate, makes

his

resignation just as voluntary as the resignations which occurred
in Knee and Christi.

(Br. 52, 54-55)

(g) Prejudicial Evidence Was Improperly Admitted.
Heslop's

position

that

evidence

of

wash

entries,

the

investigation of the Bank, and the audit by Peat, Marwick was
relevant
resolving

to

the

superfluous.
00787
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correct. Yet this evidence was extremely prejudicial because it
tended to show the Bank was engaged in criminal conduct.
Heslop argues evidence of Timmons1 salary and the payments
to Peat, Marwick was relevant to counter the Bank's claim it was
contracting

rather

than

expanding

in

1983.

Any

limited

probative value the evidence had on that issue was clearly
outweighed by the substantial prejudice of the evidence. Heslop
used speculative innuendo that the payments to Peat, Marwick
showed a strategy to use Timmons to intercede with the Attorney
Generalfs investigation so that Browning rewarded him with the
president's job, a large salary, and inordinate power sufficient
to discharge employees.

(Heslop Brief at 55)

Heslop understandably provided no citation to the record for
this theory because there was no such evidence.
theory

is

inordinate

contradictory.
power

to

Timmons

wrongfully

was

discharge

Moreover, the

supposedly

given

employees,

yet

conversely, he did not have authority to expressly fire Heslop.
Once the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence is eliminated,
that which remains (reorganization and revocation of lending
authority) does not meet the substantial evidence requirement
for affirmance of the constructive discharge verdict.
2.

No Substantial Evidence to Support Verdict of an
implied-in-Fact Contract Terminable only For Good Cause

The Supreme Court addressed the implied-in-fact contract
exception in Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah
1991).
00787
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conduct, and pertinent oral representations" is relevant to
determine if an employment manual creates an implied-in-fact
contract,

but

ambiguous.

only

where

the

language

of

the

manual

is

"Thus, when it is plain that a manual or bulletin

does not limit the right to discharge at will, the case need not
go to a jury."

161 U.A.R. at 11.

The Bank's employment handbook (Exh. 27P) did not contain
any provision providing for termination only for cause.
Brehany

suggests

evidence

of

representations are not relevant.

course

of

conduct

and

Thus,
oral

Heslop bases his implied-in-

fact contract claim almost exclusively on course of conduct
and/or oral representations.
Heslop argues his employment application was not a contract
and relies on McLain v. Great American Ins. Co., 256 Cal. Rptr.
863 (Cal. App. 1989), where the court allowed parol evidence
because the application was not an integrated contract, but also
because it found the at-will language in the application was
ambiguous. No such ambiguity exists in Heslop1s application, in
which he expressly "agree[d] that any employment

. . . will

depend upon my usefulness to the Bank, in its sole discretion;
the Bank reserving the right to release me without notice, its
obligation ending with the payment of salary through the last
day I work."

(Exh. IP)

In Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal.Rptr. 185 (Cal.
App. 1989), another case relied on by Heslop, the employee did
not sign an at-will application or agreement.
00787
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In fact, the

court distinguished Wilkerson from an earlier California case,
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Cal.
App. 1984), which held a stock option agreement signed by the
employee, "which expressly defined the employment relationship
as being at-will" could not be overridden by an implied
contract.

Shapiro, similar to Berube, stated "f[t]here cannot

be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each
embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.1"
Wilkerson (quoting Shapiro), 261 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
Even if Heslop's rehire is considered new employment, the
evidence was undisputed that the prior employment application
was revived.

(Tr. 884-85, 1016-17)

Heslop's employment

application containing the at-will agreement remained a part of
his personnel file during the entire time he was employed.
"'The general rule is that when a person with the capacity of
reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the
absence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is
estopped from saying that its explicit provisions are contrary
to his intentions and understanding . . . . f " Anderson v. Savin
Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. App. 1988)
3. No Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury's Verdict
That the Bank Did Not Have Good Cause
The Bank's position has always been it did not fire Heslop.
The real question was whether there was good cause to revoke
Heslop1s lending authority.

Heslop's Brief is conspicuously
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silent regarding his misrepresentation that Gabbert invested
$50,000 into the dairy project.
Heslop compounded the Gabbert loan's inherent problems by
misrepresenting the true facts surrounding the loan when he was
questioned about it. Heslop lied to his employer, which is good
cause to terminate.
656

O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F.Supp.

(D. Utah 1990) (Summary judgment granted in favor of

employer in wrongful discharge action, holding that afterdiscovered evidence of employee's misrepresentations regarding
her true age and past employment applications was an independent
basis, as a matter of law, justifying termination).

See also

Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th
Cir.

1989).

An

employer

should have

the

discretion to

discipline an employee who lies about a bad $260,000 loan
without fear of liability for constructive discharge.

Berube

recognized "that due deference be paid to managerial discretion
and normal employment decisions."

771 P.2d at 1045-46.

POINT II.
NEW TRIAL IS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF ADMISSION OF
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE.
For the same reasons set forth in POINT I, supra, the
relevant

evidence

was

verdict,

and the Bank was

irrelevant evidence.

insufficient

to

support

prejudiced by

the jury's

introduction of

This Court should, in the alternative to

ordering entry of judgment for the Bank, remand for a new trial
and order the inadmissibility of evidence regarding the accrual
00787
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problem and events related thereto, Timmons' hiring and salary,
payments to Peat Marwick, and terminations of other employees.
POINT III.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES BAR HESLOPfS CLAIM.
Heslop1s brief does not address the specific language of
Utah's statute of frauds, U.C.A. §25-5-4(1), which requires a
writing for

fl

[e]very agreement that by its terms is not to be

performed within one year from the making" thereof.
There is a difference between a contract of "permanent" or
"lifetime" employment and a contract for a specific number of
years until retirement. Heslop claimed the latter, which by its
terms is not to be performed within one year.
POINT IV.
ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS AN
ITEM OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989),
was an action for failure to pay a first-party insurance claim,
not an employment case.

The Supreme Court stated,

flt

Utah

adheres to the well-established rule that attorney's fees
generally cannot be recovered unless provided for by statute or
by contract.1"
context

Id. at 419.

of that

specific

The court did hold that in the
case, attorney1s

fees

could be

recovered as "an item of consequential damages flowing from the
insurers1 breach of contract."

Id. at 420.

Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985),
another first-party insurance case stated consequential damages
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are "those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made."
Id. at 801 (emphasis added) Beck involved a specific insurance
contract.

In that context, a jury could presumably determine

what was reasonably foreseeable.
However, the Bank

could not have

reasonably

foreseen

attorney's fees as a consequential damage for breach of an
implied contract it did not even think existed. Beck implicitly
recognized this:

"The foreseeability of any such damages will

always hinge upon the nature and language of the contract and
the reasonable expectations of the parties."

Id. at 802

(emphasis added)
Berube said nothing about attorney's fees as consequential
damages for breach of an implied-in-fact contract of employment.
None of the post-Berube employment cases have stated attorney's
fees are consequential damages.
Moreover, Zions First Nat. Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins., 749
P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), discussed an award of attorney's fees as
consequential
contractual

damages only in the context of "an implied

obligation

to perform

a first-party

insurance

contract fairly and in good faith", Id. at 657, which is
inapposite to the instant case because Utah does not recognize
such an implied obligation in employment cases.

See POINT VI,

supra.
If Heslop's position were adopted, the contract exception to
the general rule disallowing recovery of attorney's fees would
00787
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be unnecessary since attorney's fees could always be claimed as
consequential damage of a contract breach.
POINT V,
HESLOP'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF AN
IMPLIED IN-LAW COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED.
In Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., supra (filed May 16,
1991), this Court definitively held there is no implied-in-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment case.
Although the Court recognized "every contract is subject to an
implied covenant of good faith," it further held this general
principle "cannot be construed to change an indefinite-term, atwill employment contract into a contract that requires an
employer to have good cause to justify a discharge." The Court
concluded "the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it
could find for the plaintiffs on the basis of a breach of an
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing."

161

U.A.R. at 10. See also Caldwell v. Fordf Bacon and Davis, Utah,
Inc., 111 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989).
The law could not be more clear in Utah on this point and
should not be changed.
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POINT VI.
HESLOP'S PUBLIC POLICY CLAIMS, SOUNDING IN TORT
AND CONTRACT, WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on
Heslop's Public Policy Claims Sounding in Tort
In Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah

1989), plaintiff asserted a public policy tort claim associated
with her alleged wrongful discharge.

The trial court granted

defendant's motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court reversed, but
solely on the grounds that "the facts support a claim for
contract damages under Berube."
The Court further

Id. at 670 (emphasis added).

stated that in Berube, "we refused to

recognize a variety of wrongful discharge actions sounding in
tort."

The tort public policy cause of action has therefore

been rejected.
In Brockmeyer v. Dunn and Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wise.
1983), the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
We believe that reinstatement and back pay are
the most appropriate remedies for public policy
exception wrongful discharges since the primary
concern in these actions is to make the wronged
employee "whole." Therefore, we conclude that
a contract action is most appropriate for
wrongful discharges.
Id. at 834. See also M.B.M. Co. Inc. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681
(Ark. 1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d
549 (1974) holding the public policy exepetion does not create

a t o r t claim.
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That a majority of jurisdictions which recognize the public
policy

exception

determinitive.

hold

it

creates

a

tort

action

is not

This Court refused to follow the majority rule

which recognized a tort action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Beck v, Farmers Ins.
Exchange, supra, but rather held such a breach gives rise only
to a contract claim.
Heslop's request that the Court remand the case for further
proceedings regarding the tort public policy theory, including
punitive damages, (Heslop Brief at 78) could not possibly be
done without a complete new trial. Moreover, the evidence of a
public policy violation will not change whether it is a tort or
a contract claim. As shown below, Heslop was unable to produce
evidence sufficient to prove his claim.
B.

The Evidence Was Insufficient, as a Matter of Law, to
Establish a Public Policy Claim
The trial court1s dismissal of Heslop's contract public

policy claim was "a directed verdict at the close of the
evidence offered by an opponent.11

Rule 50(a), U.R.C.P.

This

Court will affirm if "no substantial evidence supported each
element of a cause of action.11

Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc.,

supra.
Berube indicated the public policy exception should be
construed and applied narrowly.

771 P. 2d at 1043.

Applying

that standard, the trial court was correct in concluding there
was no causal connection between Heslop's cooperation with the
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Attorney General and the receipt of Heslopfs notes by the Bank's
attorneys and Heslop1s ultimate termination. Browningfs refusal
to

accept

Heslop1s

offer

to

resign

was

an

independent

intervening act which cut off any such causal connection. The
trial court also found no public policy violation was involved
in the subpoenaing of Heslopfs notes in the Beutler case since
the Bank never told Heslop to disobey the subpoena.

That the

content of the notes might have caused some problems is not a
public policy issue.

(Tr. 1149-51 attached as Addendum 2)

One court explained the basis for a public policy claim as
follows:
Employees have redress if they lose their jobs
"for asserting a legally guaranteed right
(e.g., filing worker's compensation claim), for
doing what the law requires, (e.g., serving on
a jury) or for refusing to do that which the
law forbids (e.g., committing perjury)."
Yovino v. Fish, 539 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1989).
Heslop was never asked to, nor did he violate either of the
statutes he asserts as a basis for a public policy claim—U.C.A.
§7-1-318 (call reports) and U.C.A. §78-24-6 (subpoenas).

If

Heslop had been told to sign and file a false call report, had
refused to do so, and had then been fired; or, if Heslop had
been told not to produce his notes when they were subpoenaed by
Beutler, had in fact produced his notes, and had then been
fired, then he might have a public policy claim.
those fact situations apply in this case.
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Neither of

Heslop1s

objections

internally only.

to the

accrual problem were made

He never reported the accrual problem to

regulatory authorities. House v. Carter-Wallace, lnc.f 232 N.J.
Super. 41, 556 A.2d 353 (1989) affirmed summary judgment in
favor of employer on House's public policy claim where House1s
complaints regarding an alleged company violation of public
policy were expressed in a corporate executive meeting, but
never reported to any governmental or other outside authority.
Accord cases cited in House, Id. at 357.

Internal complaints

give rise to a public policy claim only where the employee
threatens to report the alleged violation to outside parties and
is terminated before the complaint can be made.

Id.

In

addition, House held there was no basis for inferring House was
discharged

to

prevent

him

from

reporting

his

views

to

authorities since three months passed between the date he
learned about the problem and the date of discharge.
In the instant case, Heslop knew about the accrual problem
for more than one year from the date he resigned and had
numerous opportunities to report to the regulatory authorities
what he claims was a clear-cut violation of law, but never did,
which failure forecloses his public policy claim.
That Heslop1s internal behavior with respect to the accrual
problem could be considered praiseworthy does not provide the
basis for a public policy claim.

See Geary v. United States

Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); Rinehimer v. Luzere City
Com. College, 539 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Super. 1988)
00787
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Cases cited by Heslop are distinguishable.

In Wagner v.

City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 722 P.2d 250 (1986) Wagner was
terminated after he affirmatively reported an illegal arrest to
the judge who was sentencing the arrestee.

Heslop never

reported his concerns to outside authorities.
The facts do not support a public policy claim on the theory
Heslop was terminted for refusing to acquiesce in illegal
conduct.

Even assuming illegality, Heslop did ultimately

acquiesce in the course chosen to correct the accrual problem.
Concern that he might have been subjected to a criminal charge
is not causally connected to Heslop1s termination.
In Delaney v. Taco Time, lnt'l.f 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114
(1984) defendant admitted it expressly discharged Delaney when
he refused to sign a false and slanderous statement.

No such

facts exist in Heslopfs case.
In McQuarty v. Bel Air Convelescent Home, Inc., 69 Or. App.
107, 684 P. 2d 21 (1984) plaintiff was expressly fired on the
spot after a heated argument with her superior during which
plaintiff threatened to report his alleged patient abuse to the
Health Division. This is totally different from Heslop's case.
Heslop was not expressly fired even when he had disagreements
with other officers, but instead his offers to resign were not
accepted either in 1981 and January 1983.
Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc., 147 111. App. 3rd 746,
498 N.E.2d 575 (111. App. 1986) and Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc.,
433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988) were reversals of trial courts1
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grants of defendants1 motions to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action, not directed verdicts at the conclusion of all
plaintiffs1 evidence as occurred in the instant case.
In Harlis v. First Nat'l. Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692
(W.Va. 1982) plaintiff continued to work after a demotion, was
subsequently reinstated, and thereafter expressly terminated.
None of the cases cited by Heslop in Point H of his brief
involved constructive discharge, but express terminations. This
shows how tenuous any causal connection is between an alleged
public policy violation and a constructive discharge.
There is no basrs for a public policy claim in this case,
either in tort or contract as a matter of fact or law, and the
court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the same.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the judgment for Heslop and order
entry of judgment for the Bank, or in the alternative order a
new trial.
This Court should affirm

the trial court's ruling on

attorney's fees, summary judgment dismissing the tort public
policy claim, and dismissal of the contract public policy claim.
Respectfully submitted this /y /

day of August, 1991.

STRONG/6}HANNI

Uwvt^v^/

Stuart H. Schultz
Attorneys for The Bank of
Utah
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ADDENDUM INDEX
1.

JNOV Hearing, (Supp. Tr. 28-29)

2.

Trial Court's Ruling Dismissing Public Policy Claim.
(Tr. 1149-51)
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have already been decided by the Jury.

And the cases

are very clear, and I have cited you a case in my
memorandum that if there are disputed facts, then the
JNOV is not appropriate.
Now counsel has requested—or suggested that your
Honor should have made an instruction to the jurors that
the accrual problem, the investigations of the bank, and
the circumstances surrounding the Timmons hiring did not
relate to the constructive discharge issue, or the
implied in fact contract issue.

We submit, your Honor,

that it would have been very inappropriate to make such
a specific statement to the jurors, telling them which
facts applied to specific issues in the case.

Moreover,

at trial, the Defendants had an opportunity to argue
their version, or their view of the facts and of the
issues in the case.

They were not limited in any way in

doing that.
In chambers, prior to the trial, when you gave the
Instructions to the jurors stating that the public
policy claim had been dismissed from the case, you
reviewed your statement with counsel.

And after

reviewing that statement, you said do you have any
additions?

Do you have any corrections?

At that point

in time, Mr. Hanni did not stand up and say, yes, I
believe that we should also have a specific Instruction
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to the jurors that these facts do not apply to those
other issues in the case*
THE COURT:

He had already made that argument,

hadn't he?
MR. GRIFFIN:
THE COURT:

Pardon me?
He had already made that argument

to me, and I had rejected it.
MR. GRIFFIN:

Well, he had—that's true, you

had rejected it on the public policy ground.

But he had

not made the argument that these facts, the accrual
problem, the circumstances surrounding Timmons' hiring,
and also the investigations, were irrelevant to the
constructive discharge and the implied in fact contract
issues.

He had not made that argument.
THE COURT:

He raised the issue, there is no

question about that.

And I rejected it.

Whether he

made the argument or not, I guess is getting into
semantics.
MR. GRIFFIN:

Okay.

Anyway, he certainly had

every opportunity to present his view of the facts and
the issues on the case.
I think what we need to do is look at Heslop's
record at the bank.
history of promotion.

His record shows a very long term
And implied in that promotion was

support from Mr. Browning.

And presumably the other
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strict language concerning how far they will go in
recognizing the public policy exception to the at will
rule.

And they use the words that you have all brought

to my attention, that the exception must involve
substantial and important public policies, and we are to
construe public policies narrowly, generally utilizing
those based on prior legislative announcement or
judicial decisions applicable to those principles, which
are so substantial and fundamental that there can be
virtually no question as to their promotion of the
public good.
I don't think this is a public policy case for the
following reasons:

The Plaintiff alleges several

reasons why public policy should be brought into this
case.

The first is that he cooperated with the Attorney

General, and this made one of the directors angry.
Assuming that to be true, this happened a year and a
half or so prior to Plaintiff's termination.

There is

no suggestion that that carried—at least no clear
evidence that that anger carried on, and was significant
beyond that.

Everyone else cooperated with the Attorney

General.
The second suggestion is, and I don't know that this
is in the pleadings, this is something that came out in
trial, and it may be the most important suggestion of a
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violation of public policy, and that's the fact that the
bank's attorneys asked Mr. Heslop to turn over his notes
so that they could claim that the notes were
privileged.

My understanding of what the rule of

privilege is does not include that.
be wrong.

I think that would

I think that's an attempt to improperly hide

evidence from authorities.
The Defendant didn't go along with that.
in response to that hired—excuse me.
didn't go along with that.

The bank

The Plaintiff

The bank hired an attorney

to represent the Plaintiff.
MR. GRIFFIN:
THE COURT:

Well, he did submit his notes.
The Attorney General's

investigation was concluded without any serious incident
to the bank.

This also was remote in time to the time

of Plaintiff's termination.
I find it very significant that after both of those
events, in response to the Plaintiff's reassignment, he
went to Mr. Browning and offered to resign.
resignation was not accepted.
out of resigning.

And that

And he was in fact talked

I think that's a significant

intervening event which suggests to me that even though
there might have been a public policy explanation for
the termination, I think it would be a slim one if there
is one.

That that intervening event cut off any
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suggestion that that was the cause for the ultimate
termination.
The only thing that remains is Mr. Heslop's
acceptance of a subpoena, and the fact that he turned
over his notes.

There is no suggestion that anybody

said he shouldn't respond to that subpoena, that he
shouldn't turn his notes over in response to it.

There

is no evidence that that led to his termination in my
opinion, at least not to the fact that he responded to
the subpoena.

But there may be some suggestion that the

content of the notes themselves may have caused some
anger on the part of management.

And that would be

understandable, I suppose, considering what the text of
the notes was, since the notes were critical of both Mr.
Timmons and Mr. Browning.
public policy issue.

But I don't think that is a

That's simply the

employee-employer relationship issue that you have in
almost any termination case.

And I don't think it has

anything to do with the subpoena.

The fact that the

subpoena resulted in their being aware of the content of
the notes doesn't bring it under the public policy
exception in my opinion.
For those reasons, and for reasons stated in the
memoranda that I have read that would limit it to these
brief cases, I think this is not a public policy case.
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